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Border Adjustments and the Conservation of Tax Planning
by David M. Schizer
David M. Schizer is
dean emeritus and the
Harvey R. Miller
Professor of Law and
Economics at Columbia
Law School.
This article is based
on Schizer’s keynote
address at the 17th
annual NYU-KPMG
Tax Symposium on
March 10.
In this article, Schizer
argues that U.S. corporate and shareholder
taxes need to be reformed, and the corporate
rate should be much lower. In reforming this
dysfunctional regime, according to Schizer,
Congress should keep both of these taxes as a
form of built-in redundancy; if one tax is
avoided, the other can still be collected. More
generally, Congress should be wary of Utopian
solutions. Tax reform is more likely to change
tax planning than to eliminate it entirely,
Schizer concludes. For instance, although
border adjustments would foreclose some
strategies, they would encourage others.
The views in this article are the author’s
alone, and do not express the views of any
institutions with which he is affiliated.
Copyright 2017 David M. Schizer.
All rights reserved.
A litigator, a corporate lawyer, and a tax
lawyer are at a funeral. The eulogy is beautiful, so
they talk about what they want people to say at
their funeral. The litigator says, “I hope they say I
was a staunch advocate for my clients.” The
corporate lawyer says, “I hope they say that I got
my clients the best possible deals.” The tax lawyer
says, “At my funeral, I hope they say three words:
‘Look, he’s moving.’”

For a long time, tax reform seemed to be dead,
but now it is moving. This is a real opportunity
that should not be wasted. This article focuses on
a part of our tax system that is especially
dysfunctional: the taxes on public companies and
their shareholders. Most commentators agree that
these rules are broken and that the United States
should not have the highest corporate tax rate in
the OECD.
But still, we should be precise about what the
problem actually is. Three concerns are often
emphasized, but only one of them troubles me.
First, are we overtaxing U.S. companies?
Although the 35 percent rate on the books is too
high, firms usually pay a much lower effective
rate, which the Government Accountability Office
estimates as 12.6 percent on average.1
This brings us to the second concern, which
does trouble me. Taxpayers change their behavior
in problematic ways to avoid tax. For example,
corporations shift profits overseas and keep
trillions of dollars abroad. Would anyone
deliberately design a tax system that discourages
businesses from investing in the home country?
Our system also treats firms in different sectors
differently. It is a mistake to put a thumb on the
scale in this way.
A third common concern is that public firms
are taxed twice. The corporation pays one tax, and
shareholders pay another. Yet as this article
explains, this “double tax” should be viewed as a
feature, not a bug.
So what is the right path forward? Congress
should follow a three-part strategy. First,
Congress should trade a low corporate rate for
strict limits on familiar planning strategies. In this
grand bargain, Congress should give U.S.

1

GAO, “Corporate Income Tax: Effective Tax Rates Can Differ
Significantly From the Statutory Rate,” GAO-13-520, at 14 (2013).
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I. Advantages of Using Two Taxes Instead of One
Does it really matter whether Congress uses
two taxes or one? At first blush, this seems
unimportant. In taxing either corporations or
shareholders, isn’t Congress just taking money
from one pocket instead of the other?

2

Alan Auerbach et al., “Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation,”
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 17/01, at
35 (Jan. 27, 2017).

A. Different Planning: Firms and Shareholders
In fact, corporate and shareholder taxes are
not interchangeable. Because these regimes
define income differently, planning to avoid them
is not the same. Therefore, corporations use one
set of strategies, while shareholders use another.
Repealing one tax avoids the distortions from that
tax, but the other tax’s distortions still remain. As
a result, choosing which tax to impose is like
5
navigating between Scylla and Charybdis. Each
causes distortions, and Congress is stuck with one
set or the other.
To prove the point, let’s start with two familiar
ways to avoid a high corporate tax. The first is
income shifting — earning income in jurisdictions
with a low corporate rate. Estimates suggest the
United States could be losing as much as onethird of its corporate tax revenue because of
income shifting. Also, because sectors vary in
their ability to shift income, the different effective
tax rates across sectors distort capital allocation.
Congress actually could solve these problems by
repealing (or cutting) the corporate tax and
replacing it with a higher shareholder tax. If the
United States no longer has a corporate tax, firms
would have no reason to shift income out of the
United States. Notably, a high shareholder tax
would not encourage firms to shift income. As
long as shareholders are citizens or residents of
the United States, they have to pay U.S. tax on
dividends and capital gains, regardless of where
the underlying corporate income was earned.
A second familiar response to a high U.S.
corporate rate is that U.S. corporations change
their tax residence to become foreign
corporations. In doing so, they avoid U.S. tax on
foreign earnings. As long as we have a high
corporate tax rate, inversions are hard to stop, at
least if Congress wants to allow cross-border
mergers and acquisitions that aren’t tax
motivated. But if the corporate tax is eliminated or
cut substantially, and this cut is funded with an
increase in the shareholder tax, inversions would
lose their appeal. A high shareholder tax won’t
motivate taxpayers to do inversions — U.S.
shareholders would still pay tax on dividends and

3

Tax Reform Task Force, “A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident
America” (June 24, 2016) (blueprint).
4

For a more comprehensive discussion of this idea, see David M.
Schizer, “Between Scylla and Charybdis: Taxing Corporations or
Shareholders (or Both),” 116 Col. L. Rev. 1849 (Nov. 2016).
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In The Odyssey, the Greeks had to sail between a man-eating monster
(Scylla) and a deadly whirlpool (Charybdis).
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companies the low rate they want, and should
demand in return that they actually pay it.
Second, although fundamental change can be
appealing, it should not be oversold. For example,
advocates of border adjustments — which would
tax imports and exempt exports — say this reform
would allow the United States to have a high
corporate rate, because a border-adjusted tax
2
supposedly cannot be avoided. But this is not the
case. It is more accurate to say that a borderadjusted tax, such as the one proposed by House
3
Republicans, cannot be avoided with strategies
that currently are pervasive, such as aggressive
transfer pricing. But there will be new strategies.
Although border adjustments would solve some
problems, they would create others.
I am reminded of Antoine Lavoisier’s Law of
Conservation of Mass. He showed that mass is
neither created nor destroyed in a chemical
reaction; it just changes. This article offers an
analogous principle: Schizer’s Law of
Conservation of Tax Planning. Planning is not
eliminated in tax reform; it just changes.
So how should we respond to ever-shifting
planning? The answer is the third component of
the strategy that Congress should follow: base
diversification. Congress should not rely on only
one tax. Because every approach to taxing
businesses has flaws, Congress should use more
than one. Specifically, in addition to taxing
corporations, Congress should continue to tax
4
shareholders on dividends and capital gains.

VIEWPOINT

6

Steven M. Rosenthal and Lydia S. Austin, “The Dwindling Taxable
Share of U.S. Corporate Stock,” Tax Notes, May 16, 2016, p. 923
(estimating that taxable accounts held only 24.2 percent of U.S. equity in
2015).

B. Tax Base Diversification
The answer is to keep both taxes. Initially, this
may seem like a counterintuitive claim. If both
taxes are distortive, isn’t it better to get rid of at
least one? It seems odd to contend that each tax is
so flawed that we really need them both. But in
fact, we need to diversify the tax base for three
reasons.
The first is built-in redundancy. Engineers
often rely on two systems, instead of one, for
critical functions. In this spirit, an advantage of
having two taxes is that if one is avoided, the other
can still apply. For instance, when corporations
avoid corporate tax by shifting income,
shareholders still have to pay tax when they sell
appreciated stock. Likewise, even if dividend and
capital gains taxes do not reach tax-exempt
shareholders, the corporate tax still taxes them
indirectly.
A second reason to use both taxes is that
repealing one of them is an overreaction. To deal
with the distortions a tax causes, a rate cut often is
sufficient. For instance, to stop income shifting,
the corporate rate does not have to be 0 percent.
Rather, 15 percent could be low enough because
tax planning is not free. Taxpayers have to pay
advisers and make changes that otherwise are not
appealing. Given these costs, taxpayers will
simply pay the tax if the rate is low enough.
Third, repealing a tax is not only an
overreaction, but also a missed opportunity. After
all, the government would like at least some
revenue from the tax. Without this revenue, the
other tax has to be even higher, and thus more
distortive. For instance, if Congress does not
collect any tax from corporations, it must collect
even more tax from shareholders, which makes
shareholders even more motivated to avoid
dividend and capital gains taxes.
II. Balancing Corporate and Shareholder Taxes
In taxing both corporations and shareholders,
Congress should coordinate the two taxes so that
in the aggregate, Congress collects the combined
rate that it wants. Ideally, the combined rate
should equal the rate for passthrough businesses
so taxpayers do not have a tax reason to favor one
business form over the other.
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capital gains, whether they invest in U.S. or
foreign firms.
To deter income shifting and inversions,
therefore, Congress might be tempted to repeal
(or cut) the corporate tax and replace the revenue
with a higher shareholder tax. Although that
would solve those problems, Congress would face
a different set of familiar problems as taxpayers
seek to avoid shareholder taxes.
First, to avoid capital gains tax, shareholders
could simply choose not to sell their stock. If they
die holding it, or if they contribute it to charity,
they would never pay tax on any appreciation in
their shares. Second, firms could stop paying
dividends. Indeed, if the tax rate inside the
corporation is lower than the tax rate outside the
firm (for example, the personal rate), money
would grow faster inside, so taxpayers would not
want to take it out. The corporation would
function like an IRA. Third, under current law,
tax-exempt shareholders do not pay dividend and
capital gains taxes, while foreigners usually pay a
reduced rate on dividends and pay no tax on
capital gains. This is a significant issue,
because estimates suggest that 75 percent of U.S.
equities are held by tax-exempt and foreign
6
shareholders. An advantage of the corporate tax
is that it reaches these shareholders indirectly (by
taxing their share of a firm’s earnings at the
corporate level).
So to sum up: If we repeal the corporate tax
and rely only on a high shareholder tax, firms
would retain more earnings, and shareholders
would defer selling stock. Tax-exempt and foreign
shareholders would no longer pay tax indirectly
through the corporate tax. To solve these
problems, we could go back to the other end of the
spectrum, eliminating the shareholder tax and
relying only on the corporate tax. But then
corporations would shift income abroad and
change their tax residence. So we are navigating
between Scylla and Charybdis. What should we
do?

VIEWPOINT

In addition to picking the right combined rate,
Congress has to decide how to apportion this
burden between corporations and shareholders.
In striking that balance, Congress should use a
lower rate for the more distortive tax. In my view,
the corporate tax is especially distortive, so a 35
percent corporate rate is much too high. A 20
percent rate would be an improvement, and a 15
percent rate would be even better. To fund this
cut, Congress should consider increasing the
dividend and capital gains rate or, at least, not
cutting that rate (which is now approximately 20
percent).
B. Shoring Up the Shareholder Tax
In deciding how high the shareholder rate can
be — and, thus, how much the corporate rate can
be cut — Congress should consider targeted
reforms to make the shareholder tax less porous.
Strategies for avoiding the shareholder tax are
well understood, so a detailed discussion of
reforms to plug these gaps is beyond this article’s
scope. But a few ideas should be mentioned
briefly.
First, tax-exempt shareholders pay no
dividend and capital gains tax, but are taxed
indirectly through the corporate tax.7 If Congress
cuts this indirect tax, the lost revenue could be
replaced with a new, direct tax. For example,
Congress could impose a modest new tax of 10
percent on dividends and capital gains of tax8
exempt shareholders.
Second, as noted above, shareholders can
avoid capital gains tax either by holding
appreciated stock until they die or by contributing
it to charity. To foreclose these planning
opportunities, Congress could repeal the step-up
in basis at death. Likewise, Congress could limit
the charitable deduction for appreciated stock to
the shareholder’s basis.

7

To an extent, the incidence of the corporate tax may be on labor or
consumers, instead of shareholders.
8

While subsidies for charity are important, the deduction for
charitable contributions arguably is a more effective subsidy than the
exemption of a charity’s investment income. See Schizer, “Subsidies and
Nonprofit Governance: Comparing the Charitable Deduction With the
Exemption for Endowment Income,” Columbia Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 558 (Feb. 10, 2017).

Third, Congress could target this deferral with
more ambitious reforms, such as mark-to-market
accounting for publicly traded shares or an
interest charge when shareholders sell. The
advantages and challenges of these reforms are
9
well understood, so they are not considered here.
C. Shoring Up the Corporate Tax
Shoring up the corporate tax obviously would
be desirable so that Congress would not rely
solely on a rate cut to discourage avoidance of that
tax. For instance, one familiar way to avoid the
corporate tax is to capitalize the corporation with
debt, because interest payments are deductible.
To block this strategy, Congress could repeal (or
limit) the interest deduction. For instance, the
House plan would eliminate the deduction for net
10
interest payments.
Repealing the interest deduction would offer the
important advantage of relying on two taxes instead
of one. As long as a corporation can deduct interest
payments, it is never taxed on the revenue funding
these payments; instead, only the lender is taxed.
For example, assume a firm earns $100, and uses it
to pay $100 of interest to creditors. If the firm can
deduct this $100 payment, it pays no tax. Instead, the
lenders pay tax on $100 of interest income. This
approach does not offer built-in redundancy. If
lenders are tax exempt or foreign, U.S. tax is never
collected on that revenue.
In contrast, if the interest deduction is
repealed, tax would be collected from both the
corporation and its lenders. For instance, if
Congress wants a combined tax of 36.5 percent, it
could reduce the corporate rate to 15 percent,
repeal the interest deduction, and tax both interest
and dividend income at the same 25 percent rate.
Under this new system, a business’s revenue
generally would be subject to the same rate,11
regardless of whether the business is capitalized

9

For a more complete discussion, see Schizer, supra note 4, at 18911896.
10

Blueprint, supra note 3, at 26 (“Under this Blueprint, job creators
will be allowed to deduct interest expense against any interest income,
but no current deduction will be allowed for net interest expense.”).
11

If the firm earns $100 and pays $15 in tax, investors receive $85.
After paying a 25 percent tax of $21.25, they have $63.75.
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A. Cutting the Corporate Rate

VIEWPOINT
12

III. Border Adjustments
Yet even if firms could no longer use
intercompany debt to shift income, they could still
use other familiar strategies, such as transfers of
intellectual property and aggressive transfer
13
pricing. While commentators have considered a
number of responses to these strategies over the
years, the House plan proposes a somewhat novel
14
one — border adjustments — which treat
exports and imports differently.
Under a tax with border adjustments, a U.S.
firm that exports goods or services could deduct
its costs, but would pay no tax on export revenue.
For example, if Exportco pays $60 to manufacture
widgets in New York, and sells them for $100 in
London, Exportco would have a $60 deduction
and no taxable income.
In contrast, a U.S. firm that imports goods
would pay tax in selling them in the U.S. market,
but could not deduct the cost of these goods. For
instance, if Importco buys gidgets in London for
$60 and sells them in New York for $100, Importco
would have $100 of taxable income and could not
deduct its $60 cost.
Although border adjustments are a common
feature of VATs, they have not generally been
used in corporate taxes. Even so, House
Republicans have included border adjustments in
the destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT) they
have proposed. Border adjustments are a clear
example of the Law of Conservation of Tax
Planning. Although they would solve some
problems, they would create others.

12

If tax-exempts were subject to a 10 percent tax on interest and
dividends from C corporations, the combined rate for these investors
would be 23.5 percent. If the firm earns $100 of revenue and pays $15 of
tax, the tax-exempt investors receive $85. After paying $8.50 in tax, the
tax-exempts have $76.50.
13

For a more complete discussion, see Schizer, supra note 4, at 1897-

1901.
14

Blueprint, supra note 3, at 27.

A. Advantages of Border Adjustments
On the positive side of the ledger, border
adjustments would reduce the appeal of shifting a
U.S. firm’s income abroad and of changing its
corporate residence. Border adjustments would
allow Congress to score additional revenue.
Congress also could take an ambiguous position
on trade policy, which could appeal to supporters
with competing views.
1. Income shifting.
Border adjustments obviously would change
the tax rules for cross-border activity. The key
issue would no longer be where economic value is
created, but where that value is consumed.
Under current law, whether economic value is
created in the United States or abroad is an
important question. For example, assume a U.S.
high-tech firm holds IP and a foreign
manufacturing facility in a foreign subsidiary.
This subsidiary sells smartphones to a U.S.
subsidiary for $95 each, which sells them to U.S.
consumers for $100. Under current law, although
the $5 markup is taxed currently in the United
States, the $95 of value created overseas generally
is not. U.S. tax is deferred until the foreign
subsidiary distributes this cash to its U.S. parent.
Therefore, by generating economic value offshore
and not bringing back the cash, U.S. firms can
defer U.S. tax indefinitely. U.S. multinationals
currently keep approximately $2.5 trillion of
15
untaxed earnings overseas.
In contrast, if border adjustments are
introduced, the full $100 purchase price paid by a
U.S. consumer would be taxed in the United
States. In selling imported goods to U.S.
consumers, a U.S. firm could not deduct the cost
of an import (that is, the $95 paid to the foreign
affiliate). So moving production offshore — by
moving real activities or using planning strategies
— would not reduce the U.S. firm’s tax bill
anymore.16 On the contrary, the firm would be
better off with domestic production because the
costs would be deductible. This is a significant
advantage of border adjustments, because income
shifting is difficult to stop under current law.
15

Jeff Cox, “U.S. Companies Are Hoarding $2.5 Trillion in Cash
Overseas,” CNBC Finance, Sept. 20, 2016.
16

Auerbach et al., supra note 2, at 30-32.
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with debt or equity. Obviously, there would be
built-in redundancy. Also, because intercompany
lending is often used to shift income to low-tax
jurisdictions, repealing the interest deduction
would make income shifting more difficult.

VIEWPOINT

2. Inversions.
Just as border adjustments would eliminate
the advantage of shifting production, they would
eliminate the advantage of shifting corporate
residence. Under current law, the tech company
described above has an incentive to become a
foreign firm so the tax on its foreign earnings
would be eliminated, instead of merely deferred,
because foreign firms are taxed only on their U.S.
earnings, while U.S. firms are taxable on their
worldwide income (although they can defer tax
on foreign earnings).
Again, border adjustments would eliminate
this difference — sales to U.S. consumers are
supposed to be taxed, regardless of where the
seller is incorporated. As a result, corporate
inversions would lose their U.S. tax advantage.17
3. Extra tax revenue from a trade deficit.
Some supporters of border adjustments also
emphasize the extra revenue the system would
raise. Because U.S. imports exceed U.S. exports,
the tax revenue picked up from taxing imports
would exceed the revenue lost from exempting
exports. Given the size of the U.S. trade deficit,
introducing border adjustments is estimated to
18
raise more than $1 trillion dollars over 10 years.
Of course, this number could change if the trade
gap narrows, which is a goal of the Trump
administration. But as a matter of fiscal
accounting — which has political significance in
tax reform — the fact that Congress can score this
revenue is a political advantage of border
adjustments.

4. Ambiguous impact on trade.
Border adjustments can benefit from another
political head wind as well. Because they tax
imports and exempt exports, they seem to favor
domestic production and exports over imports.
President Trump’s campaign endorsed this sort of
trade policy, so the administration might
ultimately accept border adjustments as part of its
trade strategy (although they have not endorsed
border adjustments so far, as the House of
Representatives has).
Yet in theory, border adjustments actually
should not favor exports and domestic
production over imports because exchange rates
are supposed to adjust to offset any difference in
tax treatment.19
Specifically, if U.S. exports become more
competitive — because no U.S. tax is imposed on
them — foreign buyers should begin buying more
U.S. exports. To do so, they would need U.S.
dollars. But as more foreigners buy dollars, the
dollar’s value should rise. A more expensive
dollar would weaken the competitive position of
U.S. exports. As a result, this currency adjustment
would offset the tax cut for exports.20
The mirror image should happen for imports.
Border adjustments initially would make imports
less competitive, because U.S. tax would apply to
them (with no deductions for the cost of
producing them). As a result, U.S. consumers
should begin buying fewer imports and thus
would have less demand for foreign currencies. In
response, these currencies would become
cheaper, which should reduce the dollar price of
21
imports, making them more competitive. This

19

Auerbach et al., supra note 2, at 19-23.

20

For example, assume a U.S. tech company sells smartphones
abroad. The exchange rate is $1 per euro, and the firm wants to sell the
phones in Europe for $100 (and, thus, for €100). Assume then that border
adjustments are enacted, so the tech company no longer has to pay a 25
percent tax. As a result, the company can charge only $80, instead of
$100, making U.S. exports more competitive. In response, European
consumers buy more dollars. If the dollar’s value increases by 25 percent
— so $1 equals €1.25 — the $80 phone again costs €100. In other words, a
25 percent tax cut is perfectly offset by a 25 percent increase in the dollar.
21

17

Id. at 32.

18

David S. Miller, “How Donald Trump Can Keep His Campaign
Promises,” Tax Notes, May 22, 2017, p. 1105 (Part 1), and May 29, 2017, p.
1305 (Part 2).

For example, assume a U.S. importer sells French wine in the
United States. The exchange rate begins at €1 per dollar. This means a
€100 bottle of wine sells for $100. If border adjustments are
implemented, the U.S. firm can no longer deduct the cost of this import,
and thus must pay a 25 percent tax. This means the cost is now €125. But
this higher price reduces the demand for imports. If the euro weakens by
25 percent, so a euro now costs only 80 cents, a €125 bottle of wine would
again sell for $100.
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A justification for border adjustments, then, is
that firms could not move consumption abroad as
easily as they currently shift production. Because
the United States has the largest and most
profitable consumer market in the world, firms
would still want access to that market, even if they
have to pay U.S. tax in order to do business there.
With border adjustments, firms also would no
longer have a tax reason to avoid repatriating
cash.

VIEWPOINT

B. Problems With Border Adjustments
The advantages described above — and, in
particular, the fact that income shifting and
inversions would lose much of their appeal — are
significant. But border adjustments should not be
oversold. Because border adjustments would
solve these problems, some advocates imply that
they would solve all problems. Specifically, they
claim that border adjustments would eliminate
the pressure on countries to cut their corporate tax
rates:
The pressure to have a low rate of tax in
order to compete with neighbouring
countries disappears when all adopt a
DBCFT, since . . . location decisions by
business should be independent of the
rates at which each levies its DBCFT. Each
country could therefore raise its tax rate
without fearing an exodus of either real
economic activity or taxable profit.22
This is too optimistic. Even though border
adjustments shut down some planning strategies,
they create new ones.
To be clear, the goal here is not to say that
border adjustments are fatally flawed, but to
make two points. First, if Congress wants to enact
border adjustments, these issues need to be
addressed in order to head off unintended
consequences. Second, in a tax with border

22

Auerbach et al., supra note 2.

adjustments, the corporate rate remains
important. Border adjustments are not a magic
bullet to allow countries to have as high a rate as
they want. There would still be competitive
pressures to cut the corporate rate — something
the United States has to do. But in a borderadjusted system, these competitive pressures
would manifest themselves differently.
1. Direct sales by foreign businesses to U.S.
consumers.
A border-adjusted tax is supposed to reach
imports. While the logistics are straightforward
when a U.S. firm imports goods and sells them to
U.S. consumers, the logistics become more
difficult when U.S. consumers buy directly from
foreign firms.
To see this problem, let’s start with the easier
case in which the importer is a U.S. firm instead of
a U.S. consumer. For example, assume a U.S. tech
firm pays $95 to a foreign firm for smartphones
and sells them for $100 to U.S. consumers. With
border adjustments, the U.S. tech firm pays tax on
$100, without deducting the $95 cost.
However, this result becomes much harder to
achieve if consumers buy directly from a foreign
firm.23 Under U.S. treaties, a foreign firm does not
pay tax in the United States unless it has a
sufficient presence — a so-called permanent
establishment — in the United States. Online
sales, for instance, would not qualify. Unless the
United States renegotiates 68 treaties, or imposes
a new excise tax directly on consumers, these
goods would not be taxed.
Unless this issue is addressed, it could become
a gaping hole in the tax base; indeed, tax could be
avoided not only on imports, but also on
domestically produced goods. For example,
assume a U.S. tech company pays $40 to produce
smartphones in the United States and sells them
to an independent foreign firm for $99. Under a
border-adjusted system, the U.S. firm would
deduct $40 and would not be taxed on $99 of
revenue, which is from an export. Assume the
foreign firm uses a website to make online sales to
U.S. consumers for $100 (that is, the foreign seller
is an independent agent with no U.S. PE). Unless
treaties are renegotiated or an excise tax is
23

Miller, supra note 18, Part 1, at 1115-1116.
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currency adjustment would offset the tax
disadvantage of imports.
In other words, if border adjustments lead to a
stronger dollar, this shift in exchange rates should
reduce — and, in theory, fully offset — the
advantage that border adjustments would
otherwise create for exports over imports. A key
question, considered below, is whether exchange
rates actually would adjust fully. If they do,
border adjustments would not favor exports and
domestic production over imports. As a result, the
tilt away from imports would be more symbolic
than real. This actually could be a political
advantage for those who do not really want to
discourage imports but need to gesture in that
direction for political reasons.
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2. Defining an export.
Second, if exports are not taxed, U.S. firms
obviously would want to classify goods and
services as exports. As a result, more nuanced
source rules would be needed to define exports. In
principle, the test would presumably ask where a
good or service is purchased. But is the key
question where payment is made, where the good
or service is used, or where the buyer’s legal
residence is?
As examples of the conceptual and practical
challenges that would arise in this sort of inquiry,
consider legal services and investment advice.
Under current law, services are sourced based on
where the service provider is. But in a destinationbased system, the focus might instead be on
where the client is. So what happens if a U.S. law
firm provides legal services to a multinational
incorporated in the Cayman Islands whose
markets are in Europe and the United States,
whose CEO is in New York, and whose general
counsel is in London? Is this legal advice a tax-free
export? Similarly, what if an asset manager living
in Connecticut works for an asset management
firm incorporated in Bermuda that has Asian
investors? Is the asset manager’s advice — and the
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Under the OECD’s approach to VATs, the question whether a sale is
an export generally depends on a “nominal customer,” without regard
to the possibility of resale.

management fee she earns (for example, 20
percent of profits) — an export?
Depending on the precise shape the rule
ultimately takes, there could well be ways to treat
25
these high-value activities as tax-free exports.
Again, the motivation to do so would be greater if
the tax rate is high.
3. Exporters as tax accommodation parties.
A third planning strategy in a border-adjusted
system, which David Miller has emphasized, is
that exporters would become tax accommodation
26
parties. Because their U.S. costs would still be
deductible, but their export income would be tax
free, their exports would generate tax losses.
Exporters obviously would be motivated to use
these losses. For instance, they might merge with
firms that have positive U.S. income or hold
passive assets whose income would be sheltered.
Also, exporters might position themselves as
trade intermediaries, buying imported goods and
immediately selling them to importers. For
example, if a U.S. tech firm exports phones to
Europe, it would have deductions for the cost of
producing phones, but no income from these
exports. To use these deductions, the tech firm
could buy wine from French wineries and
immediately resell it to U.S. wine distributors.
Because the phone manufacturer could not claim
a deduction for the cost of this wine, which is
imported, it would have taxable income in selling
wine to U.S. wineries (which would be sheltered
by deductions from its phone business). This
helps the wine distributors, who would then have
tax basis in the wine, because they would buy it
from a U.S. firm (the phone manufacturer),
instead of from a foreign producer. In this
hypothetical, there obviously would be no
business reason for a phone manufacturer to
become a wine importer, but border adjustments
would create a tax incentive to intermediate in
this way. Again, the higher the tax rate, the more
appealing this planning strategy would become.
4. Tax-free exports and the benefits principle.
Although the idea of exempting exports is
inherent in a destination-based system with border
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imposed, these goods — produced in the United
States and eventually sold to U.S. consumers —
would not be subject to U.S. tax. The “round trip”
24
through a foreign agent eliminates the tax.
Obviously, round trips are more appealing if
the corporate rate is high. As a result, the tax rate
would remain relevant in a system with border
adjustments. Also, base diversification would
continue to be important. If firms could avoid
corporate tax by interposing a foreign agent,
Congress would have all the more reason to tax
the firm’s shareholders, because dividend and
capital gains taxes would not depend on whether
profits were generated through exports or
imports. In other words, even with border
adjustments, two key recommendations of this
article — built-in redundancy and a lower
corporate rate — would still be necessary.
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5. WTO rules and retaliatory tariffs.
The House Republicans’ proposal may violate
27
WTO rules. These rules do not permit less
favorable treatment for imports. The issue with
the House proposal is that it allows wage costs to
be deducted for domestically produced goods,
28
but not for imports. If the WTO finds a trade
violation, other countries are likely to introduce
retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods.
6. Different treatment for different sectors.
As noted above, if the dollar fully adjusts, the
competitive position of imports and exports
should not be affected by border adjustments. But
there are at least two reasons why the dollar might
not fully adjust (or, at least, why the adjustment
could take time). First, the dollar is the world’s
reserve currency, so its value reflects a broad
range of factors, of which border adjustments
would be only one.
Second, the exchange rate could fully offset a tax
only if the tax is imposed at a single rate. But the
House proposal actually would not apply a single
rate to the entire economy, because different rates
are proposed for C corporations (for example,
public companies) and passthrough entities (for
example, partnerships). Because the exchange rate
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Notably, this issue does not arise for VATs, because they do not
allow a deduction for wages. As a result, border adjustments are quite
common in VATs and do not violate WTO rules.

could fully offset only one of these tax rates, it could
not offset border adjustments for every firm.
If the dollar does not fully adjust, border
adjustments would in fact undercut the
competitive position of imports and would give
an advantage to exports (unless retaliatory tariffs
are introduced). As a result, border adjustments
would favor companies that generate exports (for
example, high tech) over those that rely on
imports (for example, retail). These differences
across sectors could distort capital allocation.
To sum up, border adjustments are an intriguing
idea, but not a magic bullet. Although they solve
some problems, they create others. In response to
this trade-off, a plausible approach is to develop
responses to the challenges described above so
Congress could reap the benefits of border
adjustments while managing the costs.
Alternatively, another plausible approach is to
abandon border adjustments, on the theory that the
complexity and the risk of unintended
consequences are too daunting. Either way, a low
corporate tax rate is still needed, and collecting tax
from both corporations and shareholders is still
advisable.
IV. Conclusion
In the coming months, Congress has an
opportunity to fix our dysfunctional system for
taxing public companies and their shareholders.
Our corporate rate is too high, so it prompts all
sorts of distortions. Congress ends up collecting a
much lower effective rate, and firms change their
behavior in undesirable ways to reduce their tax
bills.
But the fact that we can do better doesn’t
mean we will do better. Congress should be wary
of utopian solutions that claim to solve all
problems. Even as reforms fix some glitches,
they are likely to create new ones. So Congress
should keep our tax base diversified by taxing
both corporations and shareholders. Congress
should reduce the corporate rate substantially,
entering into a grand bargain to trade low rates
for tougher rules that shut down familiar
planning strategies. Fixing these flaws in our
system is hard work. But if we can muster the
political will to do it, we will have a better tax
system and a brighter economic future. That
would be an historic achievement.


TAX NOTES, JUNE 5, 2017

1459
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

(C) Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

adjustments, the case for forgoing tax on exports is
debatable. In creating this economic value, firms
benefit from services provided by the U.S.
government. Under a “benefits theory” of taxation,
these firms should share in the cost of those services.
Also, if the United States does not tax exports,
other countries are likely to exert taxing
jurisdiction over this activity. So the result might
not be tax-free activity, but a transfer of taxing
jurisdiction to other countries.
Moreover, even if Congress is willing to cede
taxing jurisdiction for some exports, the analysis
might be different for particular types of exports,
such as oil and gas produced in the United States.
Because the home country usually taxes the
export of energy and other extractive industry
products, the United States may want to adhere to
this global practice.

